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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction of this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1988 Supp.)-
1 
STATEMENT SHOWING NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a final Judgment and Order of the Third 
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, dated 
December 23, 1988. A copy of said Judgment is attached hereto. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
WERE THE BRADSHAWS BONA FIDE PURCHASERS UNDER 
THE EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT AND THEREFORE CUT 
OFF THE RIGHT TO REFORM THE CONTRACT BETWEEN 
THE GRAHNS AND THE TRUST? 
WAS THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE BRADSHAWS AND 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REFRACTORIES ENFORCEABLE AND 
WAS THE INJUNCTION WRONGFUL AND WERE THE 
BRADSHAWS ENTITLED TO DAMAGES? 
3 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
There are no determinative constitutional provisions, 
statutes, ordinances, or rules which these defendants/appellants 
cite in their brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, 
DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW 
Defendants appeal from the judgment entered in the Third 
Judicial District Court on December 23, 1988 by the Honorable 
John A. Rokich. The case is a dispute about the sale of real 
property. The court below ordered specific performance and 
reformation of the contract for sale of Parcel 1 to include the 
Private Drive and ordered that the Grahns pay an additional sum 
for the additional acreage. (See Judgment and Order, Record, p. 
543, a copy of which is attached hereto in the Addendum.) 
B. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS RELEVANT 
TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
These Appellants adopt by reference those facts contained in 
the brief of Appellant Gregory, and submit the following 
additional facts. 
47. In July of 1986 Defendant Dean Bradshaw entered into a 
contract with Rocky Mountain Refractories, through its vice 
president Craig Ostler to provide a special insulated aggregate 
to be used with concrete, and services to be used in the home 
designed by Bradshaw to be constructed upon Parcel 2. (See 
Transcript, p. 486-491) 
48. Craig Ostler valued the aggregate to be worth 
$12,500.00 to $15,000.00. (See Transcript, p. 486-491) 
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49. As a condition precedent to supplying the materials 
Bradshaw had to be the first individual in the area to use this 
specialized material so that the home could be used in research 
and as a model to market the new material • (See Transcript, p. 
486-491) 
50. As a direct result of Grahns1 actions in bringing this 
lawsuit and enjoining Bradshaws1 construction of their home, 
Bradshaws were unable to begin construction and be the first 
individuals to use the aggregate and engineering which Pccky 
Mountain Refractories agreed to provide. 
6 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Bradshaws entered into an Earnest Money Agreement to 
purchase Parcel 2 from Gregory. At that time, Bradshaws relied 
on McNeil's survey which showed the metes and bounds legal 
description of Parcel 2. At the time they entered into the 
agreement, Bradshaws had no notice, actual or constructive, that 
a portion of the Private Drive was located on their parcel. As 
such, Bradshaws were bona fide purchasers of Parcel 2 and they 
would be prejudiced by reformation of the sale of Parcel 1 which 
includes acreage originally part of Parcel 2, and therefore 
Bradshaws cut off any right Grahns had to reformation of their 
Agreement to purchase Parcel 1. Bradshaws also cut off any right 
Grahns had to an easement along the Private Drive. The 
injunction the court issued is therefore wrongful and the 
Bradshaws are entitled to damages as a result of the wrongful 
injunction and inability to perform under their contract with 
Rocky Mountain refractories. 
7 
ARGUMENT 
These Appellants adopt by reference the Argument in its 
entirety contained in the brief of Appellant Gregory, and submit 
the following additional Argument. 
POINT I. BRADSHAWS WERE BONA FIDE PURCHASERS AND WHOSE 
RIGHTS ARE PREJUDICED BY REFORMATION AND THEREFORE 
CUT OFF THE GRAHNSf RIGHT OF REFORMATION. 
A. ELEMENTS NECESSARY TO QUALIFY 
AS BONA FIDE PURCHASER 
In the case of Hettinger v. Jensen, 684 P.2d 1271 (Utah 
1984), the Utah Supreme Court established the standard for 
establishing bona fide purchaser status. The Court held that one 
must be a purchaser for value without notice of the mistake and 
as a result cut off the right to reformation. In order to 
qualify as a bona fide purchaser, the party must not have either 
actual or constructive notice of the other party's interest in 
the property. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P. 2d 
298 (Utah 1978), defined a "bona fide purchaser" as one who takes 
property without actual or constructive knowledge of facts which 
are sufficient to put him on notice of the complainant's equity. 
In Utah Farm Production Credit v. Wasatch Bank of Pleasant 
Grove, 734 P.2d 904 (Utah 1986) (footnote 2), the Utah Supreme 
Court stated: 
Actual or cons t ruct ive not ice defeats a 
s u b s e q u e n t p u r c h a s e r ' s i n t e r e s t . A 
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subsequent purchaser must therefore show that 
he had no actual notice, i.e., no personal 
knowledge, of a prior conveyance or that the 
prior conveyance did not impart constructive 
notice, i.e., was not recorded before his 
conveyance in the same land was recorded. 
Id. at 906. 
In 1987, this court held that if a subsequent purchaser has 
information or facts which would put a prudent person upon 
inquiry which, if pursued, would lead to actual knowledge as to 
the state of the title, then an unrecorded conveyance is not void 
as against that subsequent purchaser. Diversified Equities, Inc. 
v. American Savings and Loan Associationf 739 P.2d 1133 (Utah 
1987) 
B. BRADSHAWS DID NOT HAV|B 
CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE 
At the time Bradshaws entered into the Earnest Money 
Agreement to purchase Parcel 2, they relied on the legal 
description prepared by Defendant McNeil in his survey. 
According to the survey the Private Drive was located on Parcel 
1. However, Defendant Bradshaw later discovered through 
measuring Parcel 2 that a portion of the driveway was actually 
located on Parcel 2. According to the legal description on the 
deed Gregory gave Bradshaws, they had a lot with specific 
dimensions. They were not concerned about the road as long as 
they had adequate space on which to build the home they had 
designed. Bradshaws did not have notice of an overlapping 
description because there was no overlap in the descriptions of 
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Parcel 1 and 2 according to the respective deeds. 
The deed descriptions with respect to the size of each 
property were correct. The surveyor had intended to show the 
Private Drive as the boundary but had made a mistake. 
Defendants Rradshaw could not have had constructive notice that 
Plaintiff had any ownership interest in the land he was 
purchasing. 
C. BRADSHAWS DID NOT HAVE 
ACTUAL NOTICE 
Since the mistake did not affect the size of the property, 
Defendant Bradshaw had no reason to believe that it would affect 
his title. In Diversified, supra., the Court stated that if the 
subsequent purchaser had notice of information that would put a 
prudent person upon inquiry which, if pursued, would lead tc 
actual knowledge, that purchaser could not qualify as a bona fide 
purchaser. 
At the time Defendant Bradshaw entered into his contrac: 
to purchase Parcel 2, he was unaware of any mistake at all. I*: 
is undeniable that he was a bona fide purchaser without notice a: 
that time. He later learned of the mistake which the surveyor 
had made regarding the Private Drive, but did not have any reascr 
to believe it would affect his title to Parcel 2. At the time he 
closed on Parcel 2, he understood the dispute to be between tn: 
Gregorys and Grahns. He knew the Gregorys had promised tr/ 
Grahns a driveway on their property. He was aware that. th3 
problem could be solved by the Gregorys building a new driveway 
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on the Grahns' property. 
The Grahns actually had no ownership interest in any part of 
Parcel 2 until the trial court gave them that interest by 
ordering reformation of the Grahns1 deed to include the land that 
contained the Private Drive. 
D. BRADSHAWS' STATUS AS A 
BONA FIDE PURCHASER FOR VALUE 
WITHOUT NOTICE CUTS OFF ANY RIGHT 
OF REFORMATION 
The Utah Supreme Court in Hottinaer v. Jensen, 684 P.2d 1271 
(Utah 1984) held that the right of reformation of a deed can be 
cut off by the purchase of property by a bona fide purchaser for 
value without notice. Hottinger was a case in which the 
Defendant and her husband in 1958 conveyed all of a parcel of 
land, except that portion which comprised their home, yard, and 
garden to a Mr. and Mrs. Jones with the understanding that the 
boundary line was an existing fence. In 1978, the Joneses 
conveyed the land to the Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs took the land 
with the same understanding that the fence was the boundary. 
However, in 1980, they obtained a survey and found out that the 
boundary actually extended into the Defendant's yard and garden. 
Upon discovering this, Plaintiffs asserted ownership of that 
portion of Defendant's property in dispute and filed a lawsuit to 
quiet title. Defendants counterclaimed, seeking reformation of 
the deed to conform to the originally understood boundary. The 
Plaintiffs asserted that they were bona fide purchasers and would 
therefore cut off Defendant's right of reformation. While the 
11 
Court did hold that the right of reformation is cut off by bona 
fide purchasers for value without notice, the Court also h^ld 
that Plaintiffs did not meet the bona fide purchaser status 
because they had constructive notice of the Defendant's interest 
in the land - there being an overlap in the deeds. 
In the instant case, Defendants Bradshaw did not have any 
notice of the Grahns interest in Parcel 2 since Grahns did not 
acquire that interest until the trial court gave it to them by 
ordering reformation of their deed to include the property 
containing the Private Drive. Bradshaws believed, as did the 
other parties, the road was the boundary but they were concerned 
only with the metes and bounds description which gave then 
sufficient ground on which to build the home they had designed. 
When the Bradshaws entered into the Earnest Money Agreement 
to purchase Parcel 1, that was a binding contract and failure to 
close would be a failure to perform under the terms of the 
contract. See Allen v. Kinadon, 723 P.2d 394 (Utah 1986) and 
Lach v. Desert Bank, 746 P.2d 802 (Utah 1987). It made nc 
difference that the closing took place after the parties ha:; 
found problems regarding the descriptions. The Bradshaws' bona 
fide status arose in September when they contracted to buy Parcel 
2. 
E. REFORMATION IS IMPROPER WHERE 
RIGHTS AS A BONA FIDE PURCHASER 
WOULD BE SUBSTANTIALLY PREJUDICED 
Reformation is an equitable remedy which the trial court 
used in an inequitable way. The Court injured the rignts c: 
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Gregory, and the Bradshaws by ordering reformation of the sale of 
Parcel 1. Doctrine of equity should only be used to accomplish 
equitable results. Reformation of the Grahns contract works an 
inequitable result of taking away the bargain of an innocent 
purchaser. In the case of Bailey v. Ewing, 671 P.2d 1099 (Idaho 
App. 1983), the Idaho Court of Appeals held that "reformation 
will not be granted if it appears such relief will prejudice the 
rights of bona fide and innocent purchasers. 
Bailey was a case that involved a boundary dispute between 
the purchasers of adjoining lots. The Personal Representative of 
the decedent owner of the property had the property divided into 
two parcels which were referred to as "Lot 5" and "Lot 6". There 
was a house on Lot 5. Lot 5 was sold at auction on October 1, 
1977 to Ewing. A week later, Lot 6 was sold to Bailey, who had 
attended the auction. The Personal Representative had told both 
men that he believed the boundary between the two parcels to be 
located approximately at some lilac bushes located about 13 feet 
east of the house. He also indicated that he did not know for 
sure where the boundary line was located. Both men purchased the 
respective lots on the assumption that the boundary was the lilac 
bushes. The boundary was later discovered to be less than one 
foot east of the base of the house, the vertical plane of the 
boundary passing through the eves of the house. A dispute ensued 
and Bailey brought a quiet title action. The trial court found 
for Bailey, and Ewing appealed. On appeal, the Idaho Court of 
Appeals stated: 
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It is undeniable that if the personal 
representative had not sold Lot 6, but had 
merely sold Lot 5 to Ewing, the deed to Ewing 
could be reformed. Only the rights of the 
estate and Ewing would be affected. However, 
Erhardt sold Lot 6 to Bailey, thereby 
involving a third party. Any reformation of 
Ewingfs deed adding land to Lot 5 must result 
necessarily in reformation of Bailey's deed 
subtracting land from Lot 6. ... The question 
becomes whether Bailey was a bona fide 
purchaser without notice. ... If Bailey was 
not a bona fide purchaser, then Ewing may 
obtain relief by having both deeds reformed 
in accordance with the parties1 intentions. 
However, if Bailey is found to be a bona fide 
purchaser then reformation can be decreed 
only if some way is found for Bailey to be 
satisfactorily and fully compensated. 
Id at 1104. 
In the case at hand, Gregory did not just sell Parcel 1. He 
sold Parcel 1 and Parcel 2. Defendant Bradshaw purchased Parcel 
2 as a bona fide purchaser. Reformation then could only be a 
proper remedy in this case if Defendant Bradshaw could be 
satisfactorily and fully compensated. 
There was no other property in the Salt Lake Valley which 
Defendant Bradshaw could find to fit his needs. The land is 
unique. He needed at least one-half acre to build his home on 
the property. When he found out about the mistake the surveyor 
had made in locating the Private Drive on the wrong parcel , lie 
had already expended considerable time, effort and money i r. 
planning his house on Parcel 2. 
Reformation of Plaintiff's deed to add the land on Parcel 2 
containing the driveway would necessarily result in subtracting 
that amount of land from Bradshawsf property, thereby causing 
them to lose a unique property and substantially prejudicing 
14 
their rights. 
POINT II: THE CONTRACT BETWEEN BRADSHAWS AND ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
REFRACTORIES WAS ENFORCEABLE, THE INJUNCTION WAS 
WRONGFUL AND THE BRADSHAWS ARE ENTITLED TO DAMAGES 
ARISING FROM THE WRONGFUL INJUNCTION. 
Defendants Bradshaw are entitled to damages for wrongful 
injunction. The Utah Supreme Court ruled in the case of Mountain 
States Telephone and Telegraph v. Atkin, Wright and Miles, 681 
P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984), that a party is entitled to actual damages 
sustained by a wrongful injunction. The court ruled that 
malicious prosecution is not a prerequisite for recovery on the 
bond and it does not require that the lawsuit be brought in bad 
faith or connivance. If the Court finally determines Grahns were 
not entitled to the injunction, Bradshaws are entitled t: 
damages as a result of the injunction. Based on the evidence 
received by the Court at trial, Bradshaws are entitled to damagr--; 
as a result of the Court granting a temporary restraining an;; 
preliminary injunction prohibiting them from proceeding witt 
building their Home. 
The Court erroneously held that the contract betwee:. 
Bradshaws and Rocky Mountain Refractories was not enfcr.:eabl-:. 
The facts showed that there was an offer, acceptance, anu 
consideration all of which gave rise to an enforceable agreement. 
Rocky Mountain Refractories agreed to provide their produce 
which was a special insulated aggregate to be added to concrete 
to build the Bradshaws1 home. Rocky Mountain Refractories agreeJ 
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to provide this aggregate on the condition Bradshaws were the 
first to use this product in this area. As consideration for the 
agreement the Bradshaws would allow Rocky Mountain Refractories 
use the home as a model for testing and marketing purposes. 
Craig Ostler, Vice President of Rocky Mountain Refractories, 
testified the home would be ideal for these purposes due to its 
unique design and location. 
Because of the Grahns1 complaint and the injunctions 
Bradshaws were not able to begin their home and comply with the 
conditions to the contract. Bradshaws are therefore entitled to 
damages as a result of wrongful injunction. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court erred when it granted reformation of the contract 
for the sale of Parcel 1. The Defendants Bradshaw were bona fide 
purchasers without notice, either actual or constructive, which 
cut off any right the Grahns had for reformation of their 
contract. To allow the Grahns the reformation of their contract 
substantially prejudices Defendants1 Bradshaw's rights as a bona 
fide purchaser which this Court should not allow. Therefore this 
Court should reverse the lower Court's ruling of reformation and 
grant rescission and allow Bradshaw damages. 
Respectfully submitted this day of July, 1989. 
JENSEN, KESLER & SWINTON 
^r^tM— 
Russell S. Walker 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
Bradshaw 
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ADDENDUM 
These Appellants adopt by reference the Addendum 
contained in the brief of Appellant Gregory. 
